Was the Myth of Roman Discipline Responsible for French Decimations in World War I?

A history resource article by Mary Harrsch © 2015

In my struggle to try to understand the conflicts in the Middle East, I recently watched a three-part documentary produced by Al Jazeera entitled "World War I Through Arab Eyes".  About 30 minutes into the first installment I was stunned by an account of Roman-style decimation that occured on December 15, 1914 near the Belgium village of Zillebeke.  In the documentary, Tunisian writer Jaloul Azouna related his father's eyewitness account describing how 20 Tunisian colonial soldiers of the French 8th Co. 10th Battalion Regiment Mixte de Tiraillerus were selected at random, draped with a placard and order to march unarmed into the German lines.  Their comrades were ordered to shoot them down if the Germans did not.

Although I have watched Stanley Kubrick's "Paths of Glory" about the execution of French soldiers who refuse to continue a suicidal attack, for some reason I was under the impression the film was based on an isolated occurrence.  My knowledge of World War I is admittedly limited, primarily what I've learned from watching "Once An Eagle", "Lawrence of Arabia", "The Blue Max" and a few documentaries with grainy images produced by The History Channel.  I also remember listening to my husband's grandfather, a carpenter, who was assigned to build coffins when he arrived in France in 1917 as part of the American Expeditionary Forces.  So, I was so shocked to learn the French employed full scale decimation, repeatedly that I felt compelled to learn more about it.  Not only did I find confirmation of the action described in the Al Jazeera program, the best documented, but learned that the use of decimation was employed periodically throughout 1914 and 1915 and perhaps beyond (the military records have since been sealed and will not be made available to the public until 2017). In addition to the Zillebeke decimation, I found references to the following incidents as well.

On the 23rd of September 1914 twelve men, 1/10 of the 5th Regiment of the 73rd brigade of the 37th Infantry Division, an Algerian regiment, were shot personally by the company commander in an act of decimation for abandoning the field of battle.

At Vingré, in Aisne, in November 1914, the men of the 298th Infantry Regiment retreated against a sudden attack. Six of them, chosen by lot, were courtmartialed and sentenced to death and shot.

At Souain, in Marne, in March 1915, the soldiers of the 21st company of the 336th Infantry Regiment, exhausted by the fighting, refused to get out of the trench to attack the village. Twenty-four men were brought to court martial, four corporals were sentenced to death and shot.

At Flirey, Lorraine, in April 1915, the 5th company of the 63rd Infantry Regiment, who had just taken part in a harsh offensive were brought back to the cantonment and appointed to lead a new attack.  But the men refused to get out of the trench. Six men were selected for court martial with four sentenced to death and executed.

In WWI, French colonial troops were said to be unsuitable for trench warfare so were often called to attack enemy positions.

Of the "Entente" countries who participated in "The Great War", more than 1700 soldiers were sentenced to death and executed for cowardice or desertion.  Of this total more than 600 French soldiers including their colonial conscripts met this end.  The Italian Army, another force that employed decimation, executed 750.  The English shot 350.  The U.S. and Australia were the only countries who refused to execute individuals for cowardice.

These incidents were identified by a French organization known as the Ligue des droits de l'Homme (LDH).  The LDH has been working since "The Great War" to "rehabilitate" the military records of men who were shot "by example".  These men were not only executed but, in Roman terms, suffered damnatio memoriae.  Their families did not receive any compensation for their loss and their names were not allowed to be inscribed on any commemorative memorials.

Many modern military commanders hold up the Roman army as an example of the value of stern discipline.  But was Roman discipline as harsh as we have been led to believe or did it become a modern myth used to enforce obedience in crises resulting from poor leadership?

Polybius, writing in the 2nd century BCE, clearly explains punishment by the bastinado (fustuarium). Describing the punishment for those who fail to keep night watch:

"The tribune takes a cudgel and just touches the condemned man with it, after which all in the camp beat or stone him, in most cases dispatching him in the camp itself. But even those who manage to escape are not saved thereby: impossible! for they are not allowed to return to their homes, and none of the family would dare to receive such a man in his house. So that those who have of course fallen into this misfortune are utterly ruined. The same punishment is inflicted on the optio and on the praefect of the squadron, if they do not give the proper orders at the right time to the patrols and the praefect of the next squadron.  Thus, owing to the extreme severity and inevitableness of the penalty, the night watches of the Roman army are most scrupulously kept." - Polybius, Book VI:37

In addition to failure to keep night watch, Polybius lists other offenses that result in clubbing:

"The bastinado is also inflicted on those who steal anything from the camp; on those who give false evidence; on young men who have abused their persons; and finally on anyone who has been punished thrice for the same fault. Those are the offences which are punished as crimes, the following being treated as unmanly acts and disgraceful in a soldier — when a man boasts falsely to the tribune of his valour in the field in order to gain distinction;  when any men who have been placed in a covering force leave the station assigned to them from fear; likewise when anyone throws away from fear any of his arms in the actual battle.  Therefore the men in covering forces often face certain death, refusing to leave their ranks even when vastly outnumbered, owing to dread of the punishment they would meet with;  and again in the battle men who have lost a shield or sword or any other arm often throw themselves into the midst of the enemy, hoping either to recover the lost object or to escape by death from inevitable disgrace and the taunts of their relations." - Polybius, Book VI:37

The most feared and probably most famous military punishment described by Polybius became known as decimation:

"If the same thing ever happens to large bodies, and if entire maniples desert their posts when exceedingly hard pressed, the officers refrain from inflicting the bastinado or the death penalty on all, but find a solution of the difficulty which is both salutary and terror-striking. The tribune assembles the legion, and brings up those guilty of leaving the ranks, reproaches them sharply, and finally chooses by lots sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimes twenty of the offenders, so adjusting the number thus chosen that they form as near as possible the tenth part of those guilty of cowardice. Those on whom the lot falls are bastinadoed mercilessly in the manner above described; the rest receive rations of barley instead of wheat and are ordered to encamp outside the camp on an unprotected spot. As therefore the danger and dread of drawing the fatal lot affects all equally, as it is uncertain on whom it will fall; and as the public disgrace of receiving barley rations falls on all alike, this practice is that best calculated to both inspire fear and to correct the mischief."  Polybius, Book VI:38

Roman history is littered, though, with accounts of military mutinies.  So how often were the severe punishments outlined by Polybius actually dispensed?

In his book, "Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family", Richard Saller points out that beatings were viewed by the Romans as "the grossest form of invasion and thus a deep humiliation."  Beating was associated with slaves so Saller maintained that Roman fathers were discouraged from beating their children, even though they had the right to do so, "lest the servile punishment inculcate servile habits."  Saller believed, however, that soldiers were in a separate category saying "corporal punishment to enforce discipline was part of a soldier's way of life."

Eugenia C. Kiesling, Professor of Classical History at the United States Military Academy, West Point, thinks this may not have been the case in actual practice, though.  In her article, "Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities", Kiesling points out that Roman law protected citizens from violence and such military punishments were not a necessity as demonstrated by the Greeks who were able to maintain discipline without the lash.

"Instead of assuming that Roman citizens accepted treatment in military life that they would have considered outrageous elsewhere, one ought to wonder about the realities of Roman punishment and the reliability of Roman obedience." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

Roman Centurion with vinestick.  The vitis,
however, was not listed in the ancient sources
as a standard accouterment of a centurion.
Image courtesy of Total War: Rome by Creative
Assembly.

She goes on to say,

"Almost a century ago William Stuart Messer, observing the prevalence of mutiny in the legions throught the entire history of Rome, suggested that perfect Roman disipline was in fact a 'legend'....Roman attitudes towards military punishments were more varied and complex than those of the Greeks, combining rhetorical praise for strict discipline with tacit acknowledgment of the sensitivities of citizen soldiers.  Roman commanders sometimes inflicted corporal punishment, but not as a matter of course and not without the risk of mutiny."  - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

Kiesling describes several events recorded by Livy where corporal punishment backfired on those attempting to administer it.  In 473 BCE a lictor attempted to flog one Publius Volero for refusing conscription.  A mob intervened and the lictors fled with their rods broken.  Volero was subsequently elected tribune.  In 414 BCE, military tribune Marcus Postumius Regilensis addressed the Roman senate and demanded the punishment of soldiers who objected to his distribution of booty.  The Senate was appalled by the tribune's arrogance.  After the soldiers in question learned of his demands, a rebellion broke out in camp and a quaestor was attacked.

"After ordering some of the rebellious soldiers to be crushed to death, Postumius was stoned by his soldiers.  The plebs deferred the punishment of the killers to the consuls, who, judging the case with 'summa moderatione ac lenitate,' condemned only a few." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

Kiesling points out that these accounts imply Roman leaders had conflicted feelings about the maintainence of discipline in support of the actions of a bad commander.  She says even in the famous case of Titus Manlius Torquatus beheading his son as a salutary lesson in discipline Livy appears to be uncomfortable with this extreme example of Roman "virtue".  She observes Livy rejects as too "dark" a similar story involving the Dictator Aulus Postumius Tubertus and his son in 431 BCE.

Consul Titus Manlius Torquatus beheading his son by Ferdinand Bol.

In another example from Livy, Kiesling states that soldiers so hated their commander Quintus Fabius that, after he had broken an opposing army with a cavalry charge, they refused to advance upon the fleeing foe to complete the victory.  Then the following year, the men of Appius Claudius so disliked their commander that they allowed themselves to be defeated by the Volscians.

"The general's initial efforts at punishment were blocked by his officers, who warned him that the men would fight only of their free will." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

Only after a second defeat by the Volscians was Claudius able to successfully order the execution of soldiers who threw away their arms.  Then he decimated the army as a whole.

"Caution in punishing even the most glaring military crimes can be seen in both Polybius' and Livy's accounts of mutiny in Spain in 206 BCE in the legions of Publius Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus)...Scipio ordered his officers to invite the ringleaders to dinner and ply them with drink.  Having captured them and surrounded the rebellious legions with loyal men, Scipio castigated the mutinous troops and ordered the immediate flogging and execution of thirty-five men.  The others reaffirmed their oaths..." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

Scipio took the action described, however, only after debating the extent of punishment to be meted out with his advisors.

"Over the centuries after Scipio's successful handling of the mutiny in Spain, the Roman army underwent a series of significant changes as volunteers replaced conscripts, the cohortal legion replaced the manipular, loyalty shifted from the Republic to competing generals of the late Republic and finally to Emperors (and pretenders), and auxiliary troops fighting in tribal or national units became increasingly central to Roman defense.  On the one hand, one might expect discipline to have become more severe as soldiering evolved from a civic obligatiion into a means of escape from poverty.  On the other hand, in an age of civil strife, a commander's need to attract men to his eagles may have discouraged extreme severity." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

Publius Cornelius Scipio freeing Massiva by Giovanni Batista Tiepolo 1719-1721 CE

Even Gaius Marius who was described by Plutarch as a harsh character who exercised authority with unbridled passion maintained the approval of his soldiers through the fairness of his judgments.

In his "Life of Lucullus", Plutarch says that general forced men who had fled from battle to dig a large trench while other soldiers watched, a "customary disgrace," falling far short of the expected execution for cowardice.

Marcus Licinius Crassus perpetrated the most famous incidence of decimation during the Third Servile War only because of very unique circumstances (in my opinon).  The troops who threw down their weapons and fled a battle with the slave army of Spartacus in 72 BCE were paid for by Crassus himself, purchased so to speak, by the wealthiest man in the Republic.  They were not professional soldiers like those of the later Empire but newly recruited (although supposedly trained to some extent).  Furthermore, their foe was an army of slaves.  These Roman citizens ran from slaves.  Therefore, from a public perspective, they were worse than slaves and deserved the punishment of disobedient slaves who threatened their superiors. I am also relatively certain Crassus had well paid burley body guards to prevent any demonstrations of resistance as well.

Bronze statue of Julius Caesar near the Forum Romanum
in Rome Italy.  Photo by Mary Harrsch © 2009

Clementia was Julius Caesar's watchword, though, in both the military and the political realm.

"Caesar's biggest stick was threat of dismissal from his army, which always led soldiers to beg his forgiveness and urge him to punish those who had led them astray." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

When Caesar's troops fled the field at Dyrrachium, leaving 32 standards in the hands of Pompey's forces, Caesar insisted that his soldiers felt their humiliation so strongly that they punished themselves.  Appian reports that officers, feeling Caesar's reprimands did not meet the enormity of the offense, proposed the decimation of their own units.  But Caesar reassured his soldiers rather than punish them.

Unfortunately, Caesar's successor, Augustus, was not so lenient and revived the punishment of decimation in 17 BCE.  But his successor, Tiberius was first and foremost a soldier and did not resort to cudgels to restore order when his troops became disgruntled.

In 14 CE, troops from the Army of Pannonia complained of brutality by the centurions, in particular the camp prefect Aufidienus Rufus, who was hated for attempting to restore old-fashioned hard military discipline (antiquam durumque militiam).  The soldiers mutinied and began plundering surrounding villages.  When the camp commander attempted to restore order, a notorious centurion, Lucilius, Cedo Alterm (bring another [vinestick]) was murdered.  Emperor Tiberius dispatched his son Drusus to bargain with the soldiers.  Drusus lectured the men on discipline then ordered the execution of only two ringleaders.

The Roman emperor Tiberius.  Photographed at the
Getty Villa by Mary Harrsch © 2014

Germanicus dealt with an even more serious mutiny by offering demobilization after twenty years service and cash.  When further violence erupted, "Germanicus addressed the soldiers on the importance of obedience, whereupon they took it upon themselves to massacre the leading mutineers on the spot."

Although Josephus claims Roman discipline included the punishment of even trivial offenses with death, other ancient sources do not support his claims.

"...after Vespasian's troops broke during an attack on the town of Gamala, leaving their commander to cut his way back to Roman lines, Vespasian not only failed to punish the troops for retreating but 'consoled them, suppressing any allusion to himself to avoid the least semblance of reproof.'  When troops under the command of Vespasian's son Titus ignored orders and fell into a Jewish trap, Titus merely threatened mass execution and settled for a lecture on obedience." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

"The mutinies and their resolution suggest that the army of the early Principate, though different in composition from that of the Republic, would rebel against corporal punishment and that even the sons of Princeps had to handle mutinous troops with care.  Ironically, the continuing mildness of military punishments contrasts with the increasing cruelty of Roman civilian life and the elimination of traditional protections for Roman citizens." - Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

In his 5th century CE work, "De Re Militari", Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus gives us a much less draconian outline for Roman military discipline than Polybius.

"Vegetius describes discipline as the key to Roman success, more important than numbers or even courage, but he does not equate discipline with punishment. While the Romans of old 'were strict in punishing ideleness and sloth,' a soldier's courage came from knowledge and practice of his profession.  Mutiny could normally be prevented by constant training; 'in short, a soldier who has proper confidence in his own skill and strength, entertains no thought of mutiny.'  If necessary, potential trouble makers could be dispatched to other posts.  In the worst case, that of an actual mutiny, the commander ought, 'after the manner of the ancients, to punish the ringleaders only in order that , though few suffer, all may be terrified by the example'...it is much more to the credit of a general to form his troops to submission and obedience by habit and discipline than to be obliged to force them to their duty by the terror of punishment.'"- Eugenia C. Kiesling, Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities

If only those French commanders during World War I had actually studied Roman history instead of using its most sensational punishment so callously.

References:

Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern Images and Ancient Realities Author(s): Eugenia C. Kiesling Source: Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 225- 246

Richard Sailer, Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family (Cambridge,
1994), p. 136.

 William Stuart Messer, "Mutiny in the Roman Army. The Republic," Classical Philology
15(1920): 158-175

Peter Garnsey, "Why Penalties Become Harsher: The Roman Case," The Natural Law Forum 13 (1968): 152. Gamsey identifies the use of the rod on citizens as an imperial innovation, pp.147-48

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Will New Spartacus Resurrect Old Stereotypes?

A history resource article by Mary Harrsch © 2010 updated 2016

Original star Andy Whitfield as Spartacus in the STARZ series Spartacus: Blood and Sand.
Image courtesy of STARZ.

In just a little over two weeks I will need to resubscribe to Starz on my Dish satellite account so I can watch the new series Spartacus: Blood and Sand.  The images that have been released - gritty sweating heavily armored men with the stereotypical buxom, lascivious women - appear to be targeting the coveted testosterone-sated young male market but I'm always so desperate for any kind of historical programming I will tune in as well.

Of course, no reincarnation of Spartacus could replace the classic performance of Kirk Douglas.  But, I do wish some attention would be directed towards more historical accuracy, which even Stanley Kubrick ignored in his film adaptation (and I'm not just referring to Roman soldier extras wearing wrist watches!)  I realize Kubrick was attempting to produce a film intended to direct attention to the civil rights issues of the day but using Howard Fast's novel as the basis introduced a very one-sided view of the story and presented Roman culture in almost an entirely negative light. Hollywood, with its fundamentalist take on sword and sandal epics of the period, did nothing to level the playing field either.

I read Fast's novel  Spartacus some years ago and found it so irritating with its uncompromising interpretations of good and "evil" that I actually had to force myself to finish it.  Almost all the Romans were presented as arrogant, sexually debauched and greedy while the slaves were depicted as all innocent, true-hearted and loyal (with the exception, perhaps, of Crixus).  Fast carefully omitted less admirable historical information about the brutality of Spartacus' own plunder of the Roman countryside or use of crucifixion to taunt the Romans.

Furthermore, Spartacus was not a simple Thracian slave or merely a Roman army deserter.  Plutarch tells us Spartacus' wife was a prophetess of the cult of Dionysos.  In the tribal societies of Thrace, a prophetess would not have married a simple villager or common warrior.  Spartacus must have been a nobleman who became an officer in the Roman auxiliaries where he learned military tactics and strategies.  The name Spartacus (Spartocus) is found in references to archons and tribal leaders for the kingdom of Cimmerian Bosporus, a Greek colony settled by the Milesians in the 7th or early 6th century BCE on the shores of the Black Sea.  According to Diodorus Siculus, the kingdom was taken over by a Thracian tyrant, Spartocus, in 438 BCE.

Thracian peltast 5-4th century BCE. Drawing - ballpen on the white paper by Dariusz t. Wielec.

Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

The Spartocid dynasty endured until 110 BCE with several successive rulers called Spartocus. The last Spartocid, named Paerisades V, offered to hand over the kingdom to Mithridates the Great of Pontus in exchange for help with warring tribal factions.  Mithridates appointed his son, Machares, to administer the then Thracian kingdom but Machares allied with the Romans against his own father.  Spartacus could have very easily been involved in these machinations as a member of the formerly noble house.  The real irony in all of this is that the kingdom of Cimmerian Bosporus gained much of its prosperity from the sale of slaves.  As a nobleman, Spartacus himself probably had household slaves.

Of course, the big question is what on earth did he do to get sold into slavery himself?  If we think about Arminius, who dealt with similar circumstances a century later in Germania, we can speculate that perhaps Spartacus attempted to lead a tribal rebellion against the Pontic usurper, even though Machares was a Roman ally at the time.  This might account for Spartacus being referred to by Appian as a man who had once served as a soldier with the Romans.  This might also account for evidence discussed by Barry Strauss in his book "The Spartacus War" that Spartacus was not reviled by later Roman historians.

[Image - Mithradates VI of Pontus.  Photographed by Eric Gaba at the Louvre in Paris, France.]

“Enemies were usually portrayed as monsters,” Strauss explains. “Take Hannibal. He was called untrustworthy, obsessed and bloodthirsty. But Spartacus was called patriotic.”  Strauss continues, “I was personally struck by the degree to which later Roman writers presented him as a good guy. They respected him and blamed themselves for the war."

So the famous escape from the gladiator school in Capua was probably just that - an escape.  Not a slave revolt.  As it turns out, however, Spartacus and his initial conspirators started plundering the countryside to gain needed resources.  Human nature being what it is, a chance to grab "a piece of the pie", so to speak, was probably the main reason so many other slaves and the poor joined him.  His initial victories created even more excitement and having a prophetess for a wife probably didn't hurt either.

I just finished reading Harry Turtledove's "Give Me Back My Legions!".  In it, he has Arminius ponder the reason so many of his countrymen joined with him in the massacre of the Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest.  Arminius realizes that most of the warriors took part for merely the chance to grab the prized Roman goods in the baggage train and not for any higher sense of desire for independent nationhood.  Although the book is fiction, I think Turtledove hits the nail squarely on the head.  Plunder was viewed in ancient society as a bona fide "right" of the strong over the weak and did not appear to have any particular moral implications.  Plunder was even recognized by conquering armies as an accepted method used to pay their soldiers.  So the slaves and poor attracted to Spartacus would have had no qualms about depriving other people of their possessions (or their lives) and, in fact, would view it as a fortuitous change of events, not the social class struggle implied in Kubrick's film.

Now that we've looked more closely at Howard Fast's Spartacus, let's examine Fast's treatment of his novel's antagonist, Marcus Licinius Crassus.  To maintain a crisp demarcation between the noble Spartacus and the reviled Roman general Crassus, Fast did not include any sympathetic information about Crassus' background either such as the loss of his family and fortune in the Marian purges in December 87 BCE.

[Image - Sculpture of Marcus Licinius Crassus.  Photographed by cjh1452000 at The Louvre in Paris, France.  Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.]

Crassus was descended from a consul and censor, Publius Licinius Crassus Dives, best known for being Pontifex Maximus (from 212 BC to his death 183 BC) and consul (in 205 BC) and political ally of the Roman general and statesman Scipio Africanus (the general who defeated Hannibal).  So Crassus could claim a distinguished lineage.  His father had inherited immense wealth, although he kept his family, that included Crassus and his two older brothers along with all of their wives and children in a very small modest house.  One of Crassus' brothers died during the Social War between Rome and other peoples of the Italian peninsula.  Crassus dutifully stepped forward and married his brother's widow.

Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla were two very successful Roman generals who were competing for control of the Roman state in the late Republican Period.  Crassus' father and brothers supported Sulla, a fellow patrician who favored a return to a patrician-controlled Senate.  Unfortunately, the forces of Gaius Marius gained control at one point and Marius' co-consul Cinna ordered proscriptions of many of the supporters of Sulla.  Proscription lists were issued and entire families named on the lists were hunted down and murdered and their goods confiscated.  Crassus' father and remaining brother were killed or committed suicide to evade capture . Crassus narrowly escaped death himself and had to hide in a dank seaside cave in Hispania (Spain), living off of provisions clandestinely supplied by a family friend.

[Image- Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix. Photographed by Wikipedia user Bibi Saint-Pol]

After Cinna's death in 84 BC, Crassus joined Sulla when Sulla invaded Italy to retake the Roman capital. After Sulla regained power, he gave Crassus command of the right wing in the Battle of the Colline Gate when remaining pro-Marian supporters marched on Rome in one last attempt to oust Sulla. Crassus and his troops ensured Sulla's ultimate victory and Crassus demonstrated he had military leadership capabilities.

If there was one lesson Crassus learned, though, from his early political experiences was that family name or aristocratic lineage alone could not protect you from fickle Roman politics.  But money, if you had enough of it, could.  From that point on, Crassus' entire life seemed to have been a series of choices to not only restore his families wealth but increase that wealth to a point where he and his family would no longer be vulnerable to the political winds of change.

The ancient sources tell us Crassus garnered much of his wealth when the tables turned and Sulla came to power and ordered his own proscriptions.  As one of Sulla's lieutenants, Crassus took full financial advantage of this sudden turn of fortune.  Crassus also engaged in a "fire sale" scheme where he would send his clients equipped to fight fire to the site of a burning building then ask the owners of surrounding properties if they wanted to sell their endangered properties (at a distressed price) or watch them burn as well.  This may sound like a Mafia-style protection racket but as a wealthy man, Crassus would have had large numbers of clients obligated to do his bidding.  The fact that he chose to purchase endangered properties rather than offer the services of his clients to extinguish the blaze was his prerogative.  Although some rumors spread at the time that his client firefighters got overzealous and actually started fires near choice properties, no convincing evidence was ever presented in the Roman law courts to prove this accusation and quite honestly, fire was such a hazard in Republican Rome (remember it did not become a city of marble until the reign of Augustus) that fires were commonplace because of the cheap construction, especially in the Sburra district.

"The danger from fire in Rome inherent in a large-scale utilization of easily combustible building materials was greatly increased by negligent and imprudent methods of building. Owing to limitations in the building area selected and a tendency to follow lines of least resistance at the lower levels between and around the hills, houses and shops were built close together on narrow, tortuous streets and alleys •from ten to twenty feet wide. Moreover, a population much too dense for the area occupied led to a great increase in the height of houses (Vitruvius II.8.17), with their huge upper timbers, balconies, bow windows, and other projections, which with frightful quickness caught the flames and communicated them. Thus fires were trebly dangerous, on account of the materials used for building, the height to which these were elevated (so high that water could not be raised by the firemen to the upper stories), and the narrowness of the streets on which the buildings stood. Narrow streets, of course, allowed little protection against the spread of flames, whether the building was low or high; but the tenement houses of many stories, with their small rooms, thin partition walls, wooden panels, and lattice work, were especially liable to burst into a blaze from exposure to any near-by fire." - Conflagrations in Ancient Rome By H. V. Canter University of Illinois

Rome had a city fire department of sorts, whose members were called the vigiles, that was established during the early Republic.  But as time went on and the city grew so haphazardly, the servi publici were unable to cope with the huge number of fires and companies of familiae privatae were used to assist, although these assistants were not always paid - a woefully inadequate approach to a serious problem.

Crassus also engaged in silver mining ventures and the slave trade.  But he found that wealth alone would not buy him back the lost respect he craved, especially in view of some of the dubious ways he acquired it.  Also even though most aristocratic families had indirect connections with business ventures, it was considered inappropriate for members of the elite to openly engage in business and Crassus had wantonly crossed the line on this social taboo as well. So he searched for a way to prove once and for all that he possessed the civic virtue required of the First Man in Rome.

Although he had the family lineage to assure progress up the coursus honorum, the top leadership positions were usually reserved for men with demonstrated military achievements.  Crassus had commanded troops under Sulla but engagements against fellow Romans were viewed with rancor.  Furthermore, experienced field commanders like Lucius Licinius Lucullus and Pompey the Great had managed to corner most of the action fighting Mithridates in the East and Quintus Sertorius, a Marian general who had sought to establish an independent Roman Republic, in Hispania.

Initially, little attention was given to Spartacus' escape from Capua, even though he and his followers ravaged the surrounding countryside.  At the time, most of the legions were engaged elsewhere.  So Rome dispatched a quickly recruited militia under the command of a praetor to handle what was considered a "policing" matter.  When that force was surprised and nearly annihilated, a second praetorian expedition was ordered to the scene.  Spartacus, with more tactical experience than the Senate realized, again defeated the second group and more importantly, captured their supplies and military equipment.  With plunder to be had, more slaves, as well as local herdsmen and shepherds, flocked to Spartacus, swelling his ranks to almost 70,000 men.

As Dr. Barry Strauss pointed out in his recent book, "The Spartacus War", Capua was also filled with descendants of people who had actually abandoned their support of Rome and allied with Hannibal in 212 BCE during the second Punic War. When Hannibal finally withdrew, Rome had punished Capua by eliminating its local governance and placing it under the administration of a Roman governor.  So anti-Roman sentiment was fairly widespread there.

In the Spring of 72 BCE, when this sizable force came out of winter quarters and headed north, Rome flew into a panic.  Two consular legions were quickly dispatched and met initial success with the defeat of Crixus and about 30,000 slaves near Mount Garganus.  But the remaining group of slaves under Spartacus once more routed the Romans.

Finally, Crassus' historic opportunity had arrived.  Not only did the Senate need a victory but they needed manpower that they didn't have currently available and couldn't afford.  Crassus not only volunteered for the command (the only volunteer I might add), but he personally recruited and paid for eight legions (some sources say six) -  approximately 40,000-50,000 trained soldiers.

We've considered the effect of Spartacus having a wife who was a prophetess of the god Dionysos.  Now let's look at the religious affiliation of Crassus.  Although Crassus was extremely rich, he also quite dutifully donated one-tenth of his earnings to a local temple.  But it wasn't Jupiter Optimus Maximus or Dionysos.  According to Plutarch, Crassus donated a significant portion of his substantial wealth to the temple of Hercules.  In other words, Crassus worshiped the ultimate hero.

Initially, Crassus and Spartacus clashed in a series of running battles, forcing Spartacus further and further south. Crassus only suffered one major setback when his overzealous legate Mummius, against orders, engaged Spartacus and was routed.

Much has been made out of Crassus' subsequent brutality when he ordered 500 men from Mummius' failed attack, who were deemed to have shown cowardice, to select by lot one in ten of their number to be beaten to death by their comrades.  This ancient form of discipline called decimation was first described by Livy in reference to disciplinary action taken in 471 BCE during the early wars against the Volsci.  It was also used in the 3rd century BCE and recorded by Polybius. Plutarch claims decimation was also used later by Marc Antony and Suetonius claims even the noble Augustus used it to discipline troops in 17 BCE.  The last recorded Roman use of the practice was 20 CE when Lucius Apronius used decimation to punish a full cohort of the III Augusta after their defeat by Tacfarinas, according to Tacitus.  So it was not unheard of by any means and was probably accepted at the time as an extreme measure taken to cope with an extreme situation.  It is also credited by some historians as one of the primary reasons for Crassus' ultimate victory so it obviously had the desired effect.

As for crucifying 6,000 slaves along the Via Appia?  I think this action accomplished three important objectives.  First, Crassus used this horrific sight as a visual deterrent to the largely illiterate people inhabiting the rural farms and villages between Capua and Rome.  Remember it was not just slaves who had joined Spartacus but the rural poor and disaffected peoples around Capua.  Secondly, at the time, about 20% of the Roman population were slaves.  Even though Spartacus had made no effort to free urban slave populations, the Roman public had equated his struggle with slave disobedience.  The rotting corpses lent assurance to the free population that the Roman state had the resources and determination to ultimately protect them and their homes and property.  Lastly, this memorable demonstration would serve as visual proof of who actually quelled the rebellion and brought the overall threat to an end.

Towards the end of the revolt, Pompey the Great had returned from Spain and had intercepted a group of Spartacus' followers that had broken away from the main body of men.  However, since the altercation took place closer to Rome than the last great battle between Spartacus and Crassus, Pompey's victory occurred sooner and was more readily visible.  Pompey did not hesitate to capitalize on this fact with the "press".

As for Crassus' taste for both "snails and oysters," as it was so delicately put in the director's cut of the Kubrick film that was released on DVD, there was no indication in the sources that Crassus had any homosexual tendencies.  Even if he did, I don't understand why using that type of innuendo to further make Crassus seem more villainous is an acceptable choice by the director.  It seems incongruous to me for Kubrick to use the disparagement of one minority group to promote the agenda of another.

In conclusion, I'm not saying I particularly admire Crassus, I'm only saying I think I understand some of the factors that motivated him.  I think Crassus viewed putting down the Spartacan revolt as simply an urgent necessity and a career builder but not as some glorious definitive statement of Roman superiority.

I'm sure none of these more subtle issues will be explored in the new miniseries.  But I do hope an entire culture is not vilified in an attempt to simply generate profitable ratings by resurrecting old stereotypes.

Update: "Spartacus: Blood and Sand" was wildly popular and the series continued for three more years despite the death of its star, Andy Whitfield in 2011 from non-Hodgkin lymphoma. I found this composite of most spectacular battle sequences from the series up on YouTube:



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